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Having Your Cake: How to Preserve Universal-
Service Cross Subsidies While Facilitating
Competitive Entry
William J. Baumolt
Differential pricing for access to bottleneck inputs such as local
telephone facilities or electricity transmission facilities is shown to solve
the old dilemma of deregulation. facilitating competitive entry without
destroying cross subsidies indispensable for "universal service"
programs. If bottleneck facilities are inputs to two services, one of which
subsidizes the other, entrants that provide the subsidized service must
receive the same subsidy in the access price as consumers receive when
they purchase those services. Rivals in the supply of the other service must
contribute an equivalent subsidy through paying a higher access price.
Differential access pricing allows efficient competitors to find it equally
profitable to supply either service because any motive for "cream
skimming" disappears. Such differential pricing, coupled with access
pricing consistent with the Efficient Component Pricing Rule, is shown to
be necessary for economic efficiency.
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Introduction
Regulators have long suffered from an apparently irreconcilable
dilemma. Their own understandable predilections, supplemented by
powerful political pressures, have led them to impose a set of cross
subsidies on the prices of the firms they regulate. Cross subsidies
systematically favor particular groups of customers, such as household
customers or isolated farmers, at the expense of other groups, such as
business customers or those near supply sources, by forcing the latter
group to subsidize the former.' At the same time, however, regulators have
also sought to stimulate entry and competition in regulated industries. For
example, the Telecommunications Act of 19962 requires a monopoly local
telephone service provider to lease parts of its network to its competitors at
cost-based rates, thereby allowing entrant firms to offer service without
incurring the tremendous expense of building a duplicative network before
beginning service. The dilemma is that the twin goals of imposing cross
subsidies and promoting competition are ordinarily incompatible. Effective
competition tends to eliminate the source of cross subsidies by driving
down the prices of items that yield particularly large profits.
A number of misguided expedients have been adopted in an effort to
reconcile these two conflicting objectives. Most notably, some regulators
have taken actions that severely handicap incumbent firms in some
portions of the regulated market while impeding entrant firms in other
parts. The result is the creation of a cartel in which each firm is assigned
its own monopolized terrain.3 Of course, this gives the appearance of
I For example, suppose it costs Bell Atlantic only $10 to provide most customers in New
Jersey with local telephone service. Suppose further that the cost of service for some rural customers is
considerably higher, say $50, and that the average cost of statewide service is $15. Rather than setting
local rates near $10 for the majority of customers and $50 for the more costly rural customers,
regulators may require Bell Atlantic to charge approximately $15 for all of its customers. The low-cost
customers are then said to be cross-subsidizing the rural customers.
2 Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (codified in scattered sections of47 U.S.C.).
3 For example, it can be argued that in the U.K., telephone rates were set by regulation in a




competition but ultimately helps only to protect cross subsidies from the
eroding effects of true competition.
In this Article, I propose a regime of non-uniform and competitively
neutral pricing of access to bottleneck services owned by an incumbent
monopoly. By "bottleneck" services, I refer to services that are
indispensable to both the incumbent and its competitors in the production
or delivery of the final product. I will show that the proposed arrangement
is competitively neutral, meaning that it does not favor either the
incumbent or the entrants in the final-product market. Moreover, I will
prove that the arrangement is the only access pricing rule that can achieve
neutrality in the presence of cross subsidy and price discrimination in
final-product sales. Lastly, I will argue that all affected parties can gain
from this arrangement, since it offers full access to efficient suppliers in
each and every pertinent market. Both incumbents and entrants will gain
by having access to all markets. The public will gain because competition
will pervade the industry. Finally, regulators will gain because their
apparently inconsistent goals will be reconciled: Pervasive competition
will coexist with the cross subsidies they deem to be in the social interest.
This Article is divided into two parts. Part I provides relevant
background information on bottleneck pricing issues. It discusses the
importance of bottleneck pricing for regulatory policy, the parity-pricing
formula for competitively neutral access to a single product market, and
previous approaches to bottleneck pricing. Part II shows how parity
pricing can be adapted to ensure competitive neutrality in a multi-product
industry with cross-subsidies or differential pricing. It demonstrates that
competitive neutrality requires differential access pricing that precisely
replicates the price-cost differences among the final products for which the
bottleneck facility is an input.
households. See ELI NOAM, TELECOMMUNICATIONS IN EUROPE 110-13 (1992); JOHN VICKERS &
GEORGE YARROW, PRIVATIZATION: AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 229-30, 238-39 (1988). In the United
States, some electricity cogenerators were not permitted to compete for customers with the utilities, but
the utilities were forced to buy electricity from the cogenerators at prices set by regulatory formula.
See MICHAEL E. SMALL, A GUIDE TO FERC REGULATION AND RATEMAKING OF ELECTRIC UTILITIES
AND OTHER POWER SUPPLIERS 148-51 (3d ed. 1994).
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I. Background: The Bottleneck Pricing Issues 4
A. Current Importance of the Issue for Privatization and Facilitation of
Competitive Entry
How to price bottleneck services is an issue that is being debated
vigorously before courts and regulatory agencies throughout the industrial
and industrializing world, with the formulas presented in this Article often
being the focus of these litigative proceedings.5 In the United States, the
issue of pricing is at the forefront of discussion of means to facilitate
competitive entry into activities that have traditionally been run by
franchised monopolies.6
Bottleneck pricing is now a pivotal issue in at least three industries:
telecommunications, 7  electric power,' and rail transportation. 9  In
telecommunications, the equipment of the monopolist local telephone
company become bottleneck facilities. Entrants are not able to operate
without them, and the facilities are available from only one owner. In
response, the government has required current monopoly providers of local
telephone services to rent their facilities to entrants who desire to use
them.10 This allows entrants to avoid having to build expensive plants and
equipment of their own, making entry a practical possibility. While this
solution seems to solve the entry barrier problem, the regulating
government agency must also specify the price at which the facilities will
be offered to entrants. If the owner of the facilities is permitted to charge
any price, it can protect itself from entry by setting the price at such an
exorbitant level that no entrant can afford to pay it. In State Commission
4 For references to the current literature on the issue, the reader may want to consult
William J. Baumol et al., Parity Pricing and Its Critics: A Necessary Condition for Efficiency in the
Provision of Bottleneck Services to Competitors, 14 YALE J. ON REG. 145 (1997).
5 See, e.g., Telecom Corp. v. Clear Communications, Ltd. [1995] 1 N.Z.L.R. 385; St. Louis
Southwestern Ry.-ntertrackage Rights Over Mo. Pac. R.R.-Kan. City to St. Louis, 8 I.C.C.2d 80
(1991); Alternative Regulatory Frameworks for Local Exch. Carriers, 33 C.P.U.C.2d 43 (1989).
6 See, e.g., Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions in the
Telecommunications Act of 1996, 11 F.C.C.R. 15,499, 3-5, at 15,505-06 (1996) (presenting this
issue as one that the Telecommunications Act of 1996 seeks to address) [hereinafter Local Competition
Order].
7 See id. 625-766, at 15,814-83.
8 See Inquiry Concerning the Commission's Pricing Policy for Transmission Services
Provided by Public Utilities Under the Federal Power Act, 59 Fed. Reg. 55,031, 55,033-35 (1994);
WILLIAM J. BAUMOL & J. GREGORY SIDAK, TRANSMISSION PRICING AND STRANDED COSTS IN THE
ELECTRIC POWER INDUSTRY 115-58 (1995) (discussing the efficient pricing of electric transmission
facilities and past pricing decisions by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission).
9 See, e.g., FMC Wyo. Corp. v. Union Pac. R.R., S.T.B. Fin., No. 33467, 1997 WL 768315
(S.T.B. Dec. 12, 1997); Central Power & Light Co. v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., No. 41242, 1997 WL
299703 (S.T.B. Apr. 28, 1997).





arbitrations and in proceedings before the Federal Communications
Commission, carriers such as Bell Atlantic, GTE, and AT&T have
advocated various cost standards, including both book (or historic) costs
and forward-looking cost standards such as the Efficient Component
Pricing Rule and Total Service Long-Run Incremental Cost.I l
In electricity, the issue has been raised by the inauguration of
competition in power generation. Today, and increasingly so in the near
future, the established electric utility firms in the United States will face
the competition of rival generators of electricity.1 2 However, before
electricity can be sold as a final product, it must be transported to
customers. The large capacity and high cost of electricity transmission
facilities make rivalry in electricity transmission (as'distinguished from
generation) impractical. Transmission facilities are often owned by
electric utilities; these companies and their competitors in generation must
use the same facilities to transport electricity from generating stations to
customers. Thus, the transmission facilities are bottleneck inputs to the
supply of the final product-delivered electric power-and the pricing
issue is clearly analogous to the setting of a fee for use of a
telecommunications facility as a bottleneck input.
The rail transportation case will bring out the issue most clearly. 3
Consider two railroads, A and B, which want to compete in serving cities C
and D. The cities are separated by high mountains with a single pass,
through which railroad A owns tracks and in which there is no room for a
second set of tracks. Railroad B therefore rents permission to traverse (or
trackage rights over) that portion of A's route. The mountain pass is clearly
a bottleneck input to the transportation of freight between the two cities. In
these circumstances, the question is what is the efficient price that railroad
A should charge its potential rival, B, for use of the tracks? Too high a
price will patently exclude competition, while too low a price will entail a
competition-distorting subsidy from the pass-owning railroad to the
II See, e.g., AT&T Communications, Inc. v. Bellsouth Telecomms., Inc., 20 F. Supp. 2d
1097 (E.D. Ky. 1998); Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. AT&T Communications Inc., No. A97-CA-132-
SS, 1998 WL 657717 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 31, 1998); GTE South Inc. v. Morrison, 6 F. Supp. 2d 517 (E.D.
Va. 1998).
12 See, e.g., Promoting Wholesale Competition Through Open Access Non-Discriminatory
Transmission Servs. by Public Utils., 61 Fed. Reg. 21,540 (1996) (discussing several Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission proceedings initiated to facilitate a more competitive electric industry); Ralph
Cavanagh, California Scores with New Electricity Choices, SACRAMENTO Bus. J. (Aug. 11, 1997)
<http://www.amcity.com/sacramento/stories/081197/editoria5.html>.
13 The simple example provided in the text has been litigated on numerous occasions. The
most famous case, United States v. Terminal Railroad Ass'n, 224 U.S. 383 (1912), established the
essential facilities doctrine in antitrust law. There, a group of railroads that jointly owned a bottleneck
railroad terminal in St. Louis were denying their competitors access to the terminal. The Supreme
Court found that this practice violated Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act because it denied access
to a facility essential for their competitors to compete. Today, railroad mergers continue to concern
agencies such as the Surface Transportation Board. See, e.g., Central Power & Light Co., 1997 WL.
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entrant.
The bottleneck pricing issue has arisen similarly in Australia, 14 the
United Kingdom, 5 Hong Kong,16 and the European Union.' 7 Indeed, it
appears wherever privatization initially leaves an industry in the hands of a
monopoly or, at the very least, a large firm that possesses substantial
market power. The issue of pricing is also likely to become an
international matter of great urgency in the near future as a result of the
Telecommunications Agreement of 1997, under which approximately
seventy countries agreed to open their telecommunications markets to
foreign competition.' If international competition is to become a reality,
obstacles that impede entry by foreign rivals must be removed or reduced.
B. Parity Pricing (ECPR): The Rule for Efficient Pricing of Bottleneck
Services
The most discussed solution to the problem of determining an
efficient price for a bottleneck service is based on a result I call the Level-
Playing-Field Theorem. This theorem tells us that only by using certain
formulas (equations (la) or (1b) below) can we neutrally price a
monopoly-owned bottleneck service required by both the bottleneck owner
and its final-product competitors. This rule is called the Efficient
Component Pricing Rule (ECPR) or the parity pricing formula. The term
"parity price" refers to the price at which a competitor neither receives nor
gives up a competitive advantage to the owner of a bottleneck service for
using that service. According to the theory, a level playing field, and hence
efficiency in the competition between the bottleneck owner and its
14 To resolve the issue, the Australian Competition & Consumer Commission chose to use
Total Service Long-Run Incremental Cost, the standard advocated by many potential entrants, over the
Efficient Component Pricing Rule. See AUSTRALIAN COMPETITION & CONSUMER.COMM'N, ACCESS
PRICING PRINCIPLES (1997).
15 OFTEL, the telecommunications regulatory agency in the U.K., has embraced long-run
incremental cost principles for pricing of bottleneck facilities owned by dominant carriers such as
British Telecommunications. See OFFICE OF TELECOMM., OFTEL's SUBMISSION TO THE MONOPOLIES
AND MERGERS COMMISSION INQUIRY INTO THE PRICES OF CALLS TO MOBILE PHONES 3.2 (1998)
("OFTEL believes that the most appropriate and economically efficient basis for assessment of charges
for a bottleneck service is that derived from forward looking Long Run Incremental Costs (LRIC).").
16 See I INTERNATIONAL TELECOMM. UNION, GENERAL TRENDS IN TELECOMMUNICATIONS
REFORM 1998, at 96 (1998).
17 See Directive 97/51/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 October 1997
Amending Council Directives 90/387/EEC and 92/44/EEC for the Purpose of Adaptation to a
Competitive Environment in Telecommunications, 1997 O.J. (L 295) 23; Council Directive 92/44/EEC
of 5 June 1992 on the Application of Open Network Provision to Leased Lines, 1992 O.J. (L 165) 27;
Directive 97/33/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 June 1997 on Interconnection
in Telecommunications with Regard to Ensuring Universal Service and Interoperability Through
Application of the Principles of Open Network Provision (ONP), 1997 O.J. (L 199) 32.
18 See World Trade Organization: Agreement on Telecommunications Services (Fourth




competitors, can only arise if the bottleneck service in question is priced as
follows:1 9
Bottleneck service price per unit = Bottleneck owner's final
product price minus the incremental cost to the owner of all
final-product inputs, other than bottleneck service, (I a)
or, in convenient symbols:
Pb = Pbf- ICbr (lb)
where the subscript f refers to final product, so that Pbf is the price of the
bottleneck owner's final product, and r refers to the remaining inputs
(other than the bottleneck input) that enter into the incremental cost of the
final product.
Exhibit I, below, demonstrates that at any other price for the
bottleneck service, a competitor's minimum viable final product price will
not be equal to the bottleneck owner's price plus (or minus) the
competitor's cost advantage (or disadvantage) in supplying the inputs
other than the bottleneck service needed for the final product. In other
words, at any other bottleneck service price, one of the suppliers will be
unable to achieve the final product price advantage to which its own
efficiency entitles it.
19 As I have previously written and emphasized, this pricing rule is necessary but not
sufficient for economic efficiency or protection of the public interest. In addition to equations (Ia) or
(lb), these goals require either effective competition or regulation in the final-product markets to
ensure that the final-product prices yield no monopoly profits and no other efficiency-undermining
distortions. For a summary of the discussion and references, see Baumol et al., supra note 4, at 147-48.
It should.be noted that the pertinent output increment for which the cost is calculated is the volume of
business that is expected to be lost to competitors. I am grateful to Robert Graniere of the National
Regulatory Research Institute for discussion related to this point.
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EXHIBIT 1
The Level-Playing-Field Theorem:
Derivation of the Competitive Neutrality Formula for Access Pricing2°
To derive competitive-neutrality formula (1), we define a level playing field in the
pricing of access to require the following:
Suppose a firm's incremental cost (IC) per unit of output of supplying the non-
bottleneck components of the final product is X dollars less than that of a bottleneck-
owning competitor (or the reverse). Then, this more efficient firm should just be able
(without losing money) to price the final product by X dollars less than the price charged
by its less efficient competitor.
More formally, we have as the definition of a level playing field:
bottleneck owner final-product price - minimum competitor final-product
price = IC of owner-supplied remaining inputs - IC of competitor-supplied
remaining inputs. (2)
But we know that the competitor's minimum (financially-viable) price is:
minimum competitor final-product price = price of bottleneck service + IC of
competitor-supplied remaining inputs. (3)
Adding these two equations we immediately obtain the competitive neutrality formula:
the only price of bottleneck service that provides a level playing field =
bottleneck owner final-product price - IC of owner-supplied remaining
inputs. (4)
Competitive neutrality formula (4) is clearly the same as formula (1), so that any
bottleneck service price that violates equation (4) or its equivalent (1) must tilt the playing
field, favoring either the bottleneck owner at the expense of its competitors or the reverse.
It Should be noted that the rule is not very difficult to carry out in
practice or for the regulator to monitor. Nowadays in regulatory arenas,
estimates of incremental costs are provided fairly routinely and appear to
be determinable to a reasonable degree of approximation without
20 This formula was originally contributed by Robert Willig, with the current author
participating in dissemination and adaptation to particular regulatory and analytic issues. For an early
description of the analysis, see Robert D. Willig, The Theory of Network Access Pricing, in ISSUES IN




enormous cost or effort. For example, telecommunications regulatory
agencies in the United States (and possibly other countries as well) can use
a number of off-the-shelf models such as the HAI Model, the Benchmark
Cost Proxy Model, and the Hybrid Cost Proxy Model, to calculate
universal service subsidies or incremental cost of telecommunications
network components.21 In addition, most of the state regulatory
commissions have conducted a number of incremental cost studies over
the past two years to determine unbundled network element prices.22 Thus,
if the rule is correct, to calculate the efficient price of a bottleneck service,
one merely needs to observe the final-product price currently charged by
the owner of the bottleneck facility and subtract from it the pertinent
incremental cost.
C. Previous Approaches to the Pricing of Bottleneck Services
It is not possible to offer a general characterization of the methods
previously used to determine the prices charged for bottleneck services.
These prices were often arrived at by informal negotiation between the
owner of the facility and its users. As far as I know, there were no
generally accepted regulatory rules, but where the issue of pricing did
arise, its resolution was based on what was deemed to be the pertinent
cost, which generally meant the "fully allocated cost." The fully allocated
cost of any product or activity may be described as the cost directly
attributable to the item in question (in practice, an approximation to its
incremental cost) plus some share of the firm's remaining costs. These
remaining common costs range from the salary of the company president
to the cost of a railroad track's construction and maintenance, which is
attributable in common to the various commodities carried over the given
route. Since no unique allocation standard is possible for costs that
inseparably serve several purposes simultaneously, the share of common
cost assigned to a particular product or activity was determined on the
basis of an arbitrarily selected accounting criterion. The result was
frequent litigation over the cost calculations.
21 See Federal-State Joint Bd. on Universal Serv., 12 F.C.C.R. 18,514 (1997) (analyzing a
variety of models that use forward-looking cost methods for calculating universal service support).
Many parties have submitted extensive comments and reply comments on how those models should be
refined. See id. The FCC has recently released its guidelines on telecommunications cost modeling.
See Federal-State Joint Bd. on Universal Serv., 1998 WL 751153 (F.C.C. Oct. 28, 1998)
22 See, e.g., Petitions by AT&T Communications, Inc., MCI Telecomm. Corp. and MCI
Metro Access Transmission Servs., Inc., for Arbitration of Certain Terms and Conditions of a
Proposed Agreement with GTE Florida, Inc. Concerning Interconnection and Resale Under the
Telecomm. Act of 1996, No. 970847-TP, 1997 WL 41243, at *63-*64 (Fla Pub. Serv. Comm'n May
21, 1997); AT&T Communications, Inc., No. P-140, Sub 50, 1996 WL 769763, at *30-*34 (N.C. Util.
Comm'n Dec. 23, 1996), aff'd, No. P-140, Sub 50, 1997 WL 233035 (N.C. Utils. Comm'n Apr. 11,
1997).
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A simple example will bring out most clearly the contrast between
such procedures and parity pricing, using a rough characterization of
earlier practice. I refer again to my railroad case, in which railroads A and
B compete in serving cities C and D.23 Railroad A owns the only tracks that
can fit in the pass through the high mountains that separate the cities.
Therefore, the mountain pass is clearly a bottleneck input to the
transportation of freight between the two cities. Suppose railroad A's
incremental cost of carrying a carload of lumber between the two cities is
$1,000, with $10 of this amount attributable to wear and tear of track when
a carload of lumber crosses the pass. Railroad A has been charging
shippers $1,500 per carload for this traffic and using the $500 surplus over
the incremental cost of lumber transport for the entire route to cover costs
common to lumber and other types of freight-costs such as track
maintenance and replacement. The railroad earns no more than
competitive profit overall.
Under these circumstances, the ECPR price for the right of railroad B
to send a carload of lumber over the mountain pass is, by formula (1), the
$1500 price charged by A for transport over the route, minus the $990
incremental cost of the non-bottleneck portion of the shipment ($990 =
$1000 total IC minus the $10 bottleneck IC). Thus, the parity price is
$510, which equals $1500 minus $990. However, at least until very
recently, the regulators would have calculated the fee quite differently. For
example, since the $10 incremental cost of B's traversal is only one
percent of the total incremental cost of the route, they can be expected to
have reasoned that railroad A is entitled only to one percent of the
contribution to common costs that flows from B's shipment between the
two cities, making the regulatory fee $15 rather than the $510 price
required by the parity principle.
We see that the two prices can be dramatically different because one
is based on a regulatory concept of equity and the other (the ECPR price)
is based on the requirements of economic efficiency. At first glance it may
appear that the far higher ECPR price is unfair because it extracts so high a
fee for traversal of a small portion of the route. However, as Exhibit I
implicitly demonstrates, the fee set at this level allows one to say that both
railroads are paying the same price for traversal of the mountain pass. The
lower, more traditional fee is therefore not only a subsidy to the other
railroad that can permit it to take business away from a more efficient
competitor; it also treats the two railroads differently, permitting railroad B
to rent use of the mountain-pass tracks at a cost far lower than what it costs
railroad A to provide the tracks.
23 See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
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II. The Differential-Pricing Issue for Bottleneck Services
We come at last to the central issue of this Article: How can
regulators permit competition in regulated industries without making it
impossible to retain the cross subsidies that commonly serve as the
instruments of universal service? Regulators seek to maintain cross
subsidies in deregulated industries. However, universal service often
makes this difficult, since it requires very low prices to impecunious
consumers or consumers whose location makes them extremely costly to
serve. These prices often fail to cover the costs of serving these customers,
who are expected to refrain from purchasing the regulated service if the
price of the service is not subsidized. But where such cross subsidies exist,
competition will be driven to engage in "cream skimming." Competitors
will focus on the more lucrative products of the regulated firm, which are
the products that provide the revenues that finance the cross subsidies.
Thus it may appear, at first glance, that competition is incompatible with
the cross subsidies of universal service. This Part will show that
competition and cross subsidies can, in fact, be made to coexist.
It should be noted here that cross subsidies may have a defensible
social purpose. For example, an increase in the number of subscribers to
telephone service increases the value of telecommunications facilities to
retailing firms. Since these indirect benefits ("positive externalities" in the
jargon of economics) accrue to the firms rather than to the subscribers who
pay for the service they receive, both equity and efficiency can call for
some subsidy from business subscribers to household subscribers. As
another example, it may well be agreed that impecunious elderly persons
should be ensured access to telephone service or to electric power, and that
this requires that such services be provided to them at prices that do not
cover the pertinent costs. But it may only be politically feasible to provide
the funding for such low prices from the buyers of other services of the
firm in question. Other reasonable grounds for the preservation of cross
subsidies, both economic and sociological, can readily be suggested. There
is nothing new in the observation that cross subsidies can sometimes be
justifiable. Rather, the novel point is that such desirable cross subsidies
can be made sustainable, despite the presence of competition, by
appropriate access pricing rules.
An extension of the Level-Playing-Field Theorem demonstrates that it
is possible to make competition and cross subsidies compatible. The
Theorem shows that where there is cross subsidy or price discrimination of
any sort in final product prices, then any uniform price for access to a
bottleneck service cannot be competitively neutral. Such a uniform price
must tilt the playing field by favoring some of the rival suppliers of final
products at the expense of the others.
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This observation is pertinent because, in practice, bottleneck inputs
are rarely used only to produce a single product. A railroad bridge that all
competitors along a given route must use can carry coal and wheat and
many other products. A local telecommunications loop carries business
and household telephone messages, data and voice messages, and
messages from California and Connecticut. The question, then, is whether
the price of a homogeneous bottleneck service should be fixed and
independent of the final product in whose production it is used, or should
differential pricing of the bottleneck service be permitted or even required,
depending on the pricing of the final product for which it is employed.
Here, I will argue that:
a) If there is discrimination in the bottleneck owner's prices of the
final products, I and J, for which the bottleneck input is used, so
that the difference between the bottleneck owner's prices for I
and J is not equal to the difference between the incremental costs
for I and J (that is, P1 i - Pbj is not equal to ICrbi - ICbj), then
uniform pricing of the bottleneck service will either force the
bottleneck owner to end its discriminatory pricing of the final
product, or the market must, in effect, be transformed into a
cartel in which different suppliers specialize in the supply of
different products and do not compete with one another.
b) On the other hand, if there is differential pricing of the
bottleneck service, so that the competitive neutrality formulas (1)
are satisfied for each product for which the bottleneck service is
required, then the differential pricing of the final product can be
preserved, and effective competition can continue in the market
for each of the final products. Specifically, such a differential
pricing arrangement will be the only viable solution in a
regulated market in which the regulator seeks to preserve
effective competition and to impose some cross subsidy that is
deemed to serve the public interest or to be required by political
pressures
A. Interfirm Discrimination Through Uniformity Of Access Price
The analysis is straightforward. I will show that if differential prices
are charged for final products that use the bottleneck service but the
bottleneck service is priced uniformly in all uses, the playing field cannot
be level. To show this, suppose that the bottleneck input is used to produce
(at least) two final products, I and J, that are sold by the bottleneck owner
at prices that are discriminatory in the sense that the price for product I
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minus the incremental cost for product I is greater than the price for
product J minus the incremental cost for product J:
Pfi - I~b > PJb - Irbi (5)
where the subscript r, again, refers to the cost of the remaining (non-
bottleneck) inputs, assuming for simplicity that the incremental cost of
bottleneck use is the same for both products. If the price of the bottleneck
service, Pb, is set at the average (perhaps weighted) of the difference
between the final price and the incremental cost (Pf - IC,) for the two
products, then the price of bottleneck service is greater than the price for
product J minus the incremental cost for J:
Pb > PlbJ- ICrbJ (6)
So, if a competitor, C, has the same cost for the remaining inputs (that is,
ICrbj = ICXrcj), then
P~jb < Pb + ICrcj = min Pfj (7)
meaning that a competitor who is just as efficient as the bottleneck owner
in supplying product J will be unable, without losing money on sales of J,
to charge a final-product price, Pfj, that is as low as that of the bottleneck
owner. Clearly, the playing field for sale of J will not be level, and the
competitor will find itself unable to compete in the product-J market, even
though it is an equally efficient producer of J. Of course, the problem is
that the uniform price of the bottleneck service must exceed the
competitively-neutral price for that input when it is used to produce output
J. The competitor will be saddled with what amounts to an excessive
discriminatory price for the bottleneck service that handicaps or prevents
its competition with the bottleneck owner in the supply of product J.
The same reasoning shows that the uniform averaged competitively-
neutral price for the bottleneck service will render the bottleneck service
owner's price for product I greater than the competitor's minimum price
for product I,
Pbi > min Pfci (8)
if the bottleneck owner and the competitor are equally efficient in
supplying product I. Thus, the averaged uniform price for the bottleneck
service must tilt the playing field in the competitor's favor in the supply of
product L
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More generally, we have the Uniform Access-Price Theorem: If the
final-product prices for two goods that use a bottleneck service as an input
are discriminatory in the sense of (5), then no uniform bottleneck-service
price can satisfy the competitive neutrality requirement (4) for every final
product, so that for those products for which it is not satisfied one of the
suppliers of those products must be handicapped in a discriminatory
manner.
The implications are clear. The competitor will be forced to supply
those products in which the net yield to the bottleneck owner, Pjb - ICb, is
greatest. This is another way of saying that the competitor will have no
option but to engage in cream skimming.
There are two possible scenarios for the sequel:
a) The bottleneck owner will reduce its price for final-product I, and
(particularly if it is losing money on J, meaning that a cross
subsidy is involved) it may be forced to raise its price for final
product J until the two sides of inequality (5) are made equal to
one another. Then the discrimination in final-product prices will
have been ended by competition-the expected sequel to cream-
skimming competition.
b) Alternatively, either regulatory fiat or self-interest or some other
exogenous force may keep the final-product prices of I and J at
their discriminatory level. Then the bottleneck owner will find
itself the sole supplier of product J, while the other firm (if there
are only two firms) will become the sole supplier of L In that
case, the result will be, in effect, the establishment of a cartel in
which each firm finds itself assigned an exclusive territory that is
immune from direct competition. Some truncated competitive
force will remain in the market, since each firm will have to keep
the price of its final product below the level that will make entry
into that field by the other firm financially feasible. But up to that
limit each firm will be shielded from the constraint of effective
competition. There will be more than one firm in the industry, but
there will be no real competition.
B. Consequences ofDifferential Competitively-Neutral Prices for
Bottleneck Services
As an alternative, the regulator can impose strict compliance with
competitive neutrality for a bottleneck service, final product by final
product. By now, it should be evident that this requires the price charged
by the bottleneck owner to vary with the use to which the bottleneck
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service is put by a competitor. It may require a bottleneck service fee of X
dollars per minute when the bottleneck is used to carry calls from business
customers and Y dollars per minute if it transmits calls from households.
Competitive-neutrality formula (4) tells us, ceteris paribus, that the
bottleneck service price must vary from one bottleneck use to another
precisely by the amount that the corresponding final product prices vary.
For example, given two final products with equal incremental costs for
which the price of one product is 0.2 dollars more than the other, the
competitively-neutral prices of bottleneck service for the two uses must
also differ by exactly 0.2 dollars. Several consequences follow from such a
pricing arrangement.
1. Bottleneck-Owner Indifference Among Suppliers
With these access prices, the bottleneck owner will be indifferent, so
far as profits are concerned, between use of its facilities by itself and use
of those facilities by its competitors. The competitive neutrality pricing
formula guarantees that the bottleneck owner will obtain exactly the same
profit whichever of the two courses is taken. For with price set in accord
with formula (4), the sale of Iby a rival will yield bottleneck price:
Pbi = Pji - ICrbi = R (9)
where R is defined as the cost of providing a unit of bottleneck service for
product I plus the profit the bottleneck owner would obtain from its own
sale of a unit of L
Thus, for each product I, the price charged by the bottleneck owner to
competitors for bottleneck services will give the owner exactly the same
profit as if it had used the services to supply product I itself. This result is
well known in the literature on parity (ECPR) pricing.24
2. Access Prices for Cross-Subsidized Products
The second implication of differential and competitively-neutral
pricing is more surprising: It follows from (9) that if final-product J is the
recipient of a cross subsidy and is therefore priced below incremental cost
(its profit yield to the bottleneck owner is negative), then the
competitively-neutral price for bottleneck service to be used in the
production of J must also be less than the incremental cost of supplying
the bottleneck service for the purpose!
24 See, e.g., Baumol et al., supra note 4, at 146.
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Though this result may seem bizarre at first, its logic is
straightforward. Cross subsidy by the bottleneck owner means that in order
for rivals to compete effectively with the bottleneck owner, replication of
this cross subsidy must be available to them in some way. If the bottleneck
owner sells product J to consumers at a price below cost, then it must
provide its rivals with bottleneck service at a price that does not cover cost
as well. In other words, if product J is the recipient of a cross subsidy
when sold by the bottleneck proprietor, then competitive neutrality
requires that the same cross subsidy be made available to rival suppliers of
J through access pricing. Otherwise, rivals that have no other source of
cross subsidy will not be able to compete in the supply of J because of
their inability to match the bottleneck owner's final-product price of J. In
these circumstances, if the bottleneck service price covers the entire
incremental cost of providing the service for output J production, the
playing field cannot be level.
3. Open Competition in all Industry Products
Differential and competitively-neutral prices offer entrants and other
rivals of the bottleneck owner the prospect that they will be able to
compete in every market in which the bottleneck owner offers products.
Thus, unless their entry or survival is threatened by the inefficiency of
their own operations, they will not find themselves excluded from any
branch of the regulated industry.
4. Cream Skimming Prevention-Competitor Indifference Among
the Different Products That Are Supplied with the Aid of the
Bottleneck
The fourth consequence of differential and competitively-neutral
prices is that they eliminate any incentive for cream skimming by
competitors. The differential bottleneck service price is adjusted so that
when a final product price is relatively high, the bottleneck service price
for use in making that product will be elevated by exactly the same
amount, other things being equal. Consequently, the competitor will have
no incentive to favor high-priced products over low-priced products.
5. Preservation of Cross Subsidies Despite Effective Competition
The final implication of differential and competitively-neutral pricing
should now be obvious. In contrast to what is normally expected, such a
pricing arrangement is consistent with continued competition in each and
every one of the bottleneck owner's products, along with preservation of
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any and all cross subsidies in the bottleneck owner's final-product prices.
Thus, these access prices enable the regulator to have it both ways. They
enable competition to survive and even to permeate every branch of the
regulated industry. They also permit retention of the cross-subsidies
characteristically favored by regulators. Regulators can now require
impoverished families, or isolated farmers and other customers whom it is
especially costly to serve, to be granted subsidized prices. They can also
demand that prices favor household over business customers. In short,
differential and competitively-neutral pricing promotes universal service
by means of cross subsidy without precluding the forces of competition
that otherwise undermine universal service.
Conclusion
It is this last feature of differentiated, competitively-neutral pricing
that may make it most attractive to regulators in practice and that may be
most relevant for practice. It reconciles the goal of promoting competition
with the objective of helping particular classes of customers. Moreover, it
opens the regulated fields to entrants and permits them and other rivals to
compete in every product market on the basis of relative efficiency. The
public can benefit from the pervasive competition that it makes possible.
Even the bottleneck owner has something to gain from the arrangement.
Although the owner will end up facing rivals in the sale of every one of its
products, it will not find itself effectively excluded from any of those
markets by distorted prices. Furthermore, its legitimate profits will be
protected through the competitively-neutral character of the bottleneck
prices. It has been proven here that in an industry that is characterized by
differential final-product prices and cross subsidy, as most regulated
industries are in reality,2" any uniform access price for bottleneck services
cannot be competitively neutral. Productive efficiency is necessarily
undermined when less efficient firms are allowed to undercut suppliers
that are more efficient in their use of resources. Despite its advantages,
differential competitive neutrality has rarely been considered as an option
by either practitioners or analysts. This option should not be overlooked.
Although it may prove to have shortcomings that have not yet been
recognized, it merits careful consideration at the very least.
25 See W. Kip Viscusi ET AL., ECONOMICS OF REGULATION AND ANTITRUST 532 (2d ed.
1995).

